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INTRODUCTION
Price controls are unpopular, except when they are imposed on plaintiffs’ lawyers. Sixteen states have caps on contingency fees;1 none cap defense-side fees.2 The federal government limits the fees plaintiffs can pay
in Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) cases,3 Social Security disability cases,4 and claims for veterans’ benefits.5 In 2003, 2004, and 2005, the House
of Representatives passed a bill capping contingency fees in medical malpractice cases—only to see it die in the Senate each time.6 Judges have followed suit; in recent aggregate products liability proceedings, three federal
judges capped the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees after noting a “trend in the states
to limit contingent fees to 33-1/3% or less of net recovery.”7
Claimants are the supposed beneficiaries of these restrictions, which are
said to protect them from excessive legal fees.8 The assertion is facially
plausible: lawyers’ fees are the biggest component of litigation costs, so
policies that reduce fees may help claimants. Yet, the pressure to cap contingent fees comes from tort reform groups, representing drug manufacturers, medical providers, liability insurers, and other repeat players on the defense side in litigation. Like all interest groups, tort reform groups
advocate policies that help their supporters.9 Because tort reform groups
have defendants’ interests at heart, it is safe to assume that these groups

1. See generally David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Charles Silver & William Sage, Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355 (2009) [hereinafter Damage Caps].
2. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2678 (West 2006) (FTCA cap of 20-25%).
4. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 406 (West 2006) (Social Security cap of 25%).
5. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, §§ 6-7, 12 Stat. 566, 568.
6. See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (“HEALTH”) Act of
2005, H.R. 5, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. § 5 (2004).
7. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see
also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 617 (E.D. La. 2008); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at
*17 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008). For an analysis of judicial practices regarding fees in MDLs,
see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352646.
8. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 360 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that fee caps were originally implemented “to protect the
veteran from extortion or improvident bargains with unscrupulous lawyers”).
9. These policies include such reforms as caps on compensatory and punitive damages,
abolition of the collateral source rule, heightened standards of pleading and proof, mandatory non-binding alternative dispute resolution, and limits on advertising by attorneys. The
object of these policies is to reduce claim values by lowering recoveries and making litigation more expensive.
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expect caps on contingency fees to help defendants—most likely because
price controls tend to cause the supply and quality of services to decline.10
When lawsuits become less profitable for lawyers, plaintiffs’ attorneys will
predictably become more selective and may even move into other uncapped lines of work, or retire. Because expected marginal earnings also
decline, lawyers will predictably invest less in the cases they do accept—
that is, they will litigate less intensively.
Will plaintiffs’ ability to recover for their injuries also decline? Although most academics believe “meaningful access” to the tort system requires legal counsel,11 claimants can always represent themselves.12 Many
tort claims settle without formal litigation, and nearly all settle without trials.13 Some studies contend that claimants who represent themselves don’t
do that much worse than claimants represented by attorneys once attorneys’
fees are subtracted.14 If self-representation is a viable option, caps on con-

10. See generally ROBERT L. SCHUETTINGER
OF WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS (1979).

& EAMONN F. BUTLER, FORTY CENTURIES

11. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Texas Plaintiffs’ Practice in the Age of Tort
Reform: Survival of the Fittest—It’s Even More True Now, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 285, 287
(2006/2007) [hereinafter Survival of the Fittest]; see also HERBERT JACOB, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 123 (1986); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Access Denied:
‘Tort Reform’ Rhetoric is Closing the Courthouse Door, 33 TRIAL 26 (1997). See generally
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between
Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635 (2006) [hereinafter The Texas Two-Step] (discussing generally the possible link between damage caps
in medical malpractice cases and access); Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as
Gatekeeper in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997).
12. See Kuo-Chang Huang, How Legal Representation Affects Case Outcomes: An Empirical Perspective from Taiwan, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 201-08 (2008) (reporting
that both parties were represented in only 21% of over 100,000 cases formally litigated in
Taiwan from 2000 to 2006); Bruce D. Sales, Connie J. Beck & Richard K. Haan, Is SelfRepresentation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 594 (1993) (studying divorce cases in Maricopa County, Arizona in
1990 and finding that “approximately 90% of the cases involved at least one litigant who
self-represented, while in 52% of the cases both parties self-represented”). The frequency
of self-representation appears to be growing, as the number of persons unable to afford attorneys rises. See, e.g., Margery A. Gibbs, More Americans Serving as Their Own Lawyers,
YAHOO NEWS, Nov. 24, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081124/ap_on_re_us/
representing_yourself.
13. The conventional wisdom is that only 2-3% of lawsuits are tried, and that in recent
decades the trial rate has declined. For statistics and possible explanations, see the articles
collected in 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
14. See JAMES K. HAMMITT, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION, VOL. II: PAYMENTS
BY AUTO INSURERS 37 (1985) (finding that represented claimants fared much better than unrepresented claimants in tort fault states after attorneys’ fees were deducted but that the difference was much smaller in no-fault states); Terry Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid What
They’re Worth? Contingent Fees and the Settlement Process, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 221
(1991) (finding that “by retaining legal counsel, the average New York workers’ compensa-
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tingency fees may have less of an impact on access than one might otherwise expect.15 Conversely, if tort recoveries flow only or mostly to plaintiffs who either actually hire lawyers or can credibly threaten to do so, caps
on contingency fees may make it difficult or impossible for many victims
to obtain justice.
We explore this issue by looking at patterns of representation among
claimants who received payments for bodily injuries (“BI”) in Texas during
1988-2005. Our database includes every closed claim with a payout greater than or equal to $10,000 (nominal) from five commercial lines of insurance. Approximately 7% of successful BI claimants represented themselves. Paid claims brought by persons who represented themselves had
smaller payouts and were almost always resolved without litigation. Selfrepresentation was roughly four times as common (12% versus 3.3%) in
small claims (less than $10,000) as compared to large claims (greater than
$25,000) (both amounts in 2008 dollars). The filing of a lawsuit marked a
fundamental divide: almost 16% of claims resolved without filing a lawsuit
involved self-represented claimants, compared with a mere 0.2% of claims
resolved after a lawsuit was filed.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes our data, Part III
presents our results, Part IV discusses the implications of our findings, and
Part V concludes.16
I. DATA DESCRIPTION
We have published a series of articles on tort litigation17 using the Texas
Closed Claim Database (“TCCD”), which is maintained by the Texas Detion claimant with a nonscheduled [permanent partial disability] may expect to receive almost $6,000 less in benefits than will the claimant who does not retain counsel”).
15. We use the label “self-represented claimants” rather than “pro se claimants” to avoid
the association with lawsuits the phrase “pro se” entails. As shown below, the overwhelming majority of payments recovered by self-represented claimants were obtained without
filing a lawsuit.
16. Closed claim data collected by the Texas Department of Insurance can be downloaded free of charge. TEX. DEP’T OF INS. REPORTS LISTING, http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/
reports/report4.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
17. The articles include Bernard Black, David A. Hyman, Charles Silver & William M.
Sage, Defense Costs and Insurer Reserves in Medical Malpractice and Other Personal Injury Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1988-2004, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 185 (2008); Bernard
Black, Charles Silver, David A. Hyman & William M. Sage, Stability, Not Crisis: Medical
Malpractice Claim Outcomes In Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005)
[hereinafter Stability, Not Crisis]; Frank Cross & Charles Silver, In Texas, Life is Cheap, 59
VAND. L. REV. 1875 (2006); David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver & William M. Sage, Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award?: Post-Verdict Haircuts in
Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988-2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3 (2007) [hereinafter Jury Verdicts]; Charles Silver, David A. Hyman & Bernard S. Black, The Impact of
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partment of Insurance (“TDI”). The TCCD, which we describe more fully
in other works, contains individual reports of all Texas BI claims covered
by five lines of commercial insurance (auto, general commercial, multiperil, medical professional liability, and other professional liability) that
closed with payments exceeding $10,000 (nominal) from 1988 to 2005.18
Because the TCCD uses a fixed nominal dollar reporting threshold, the
dataset is subject to bracket creep. Over time, the lower end of the bracket
creeps downward, encompassing smaller and smaller claims. Thus, a claim
worth $10,000 (nominal) in 2005 would have been worth only $6,057 in
1988. More generally, a claim worth $10,000 in 2005 would have been
worth less than $10,000 in any year prior to 2005, and thus would not have
been reported to TDI. Bracket creep has the potential to make time trends
in the TCCD misleading.
In other publications, we address the problem of bracket creep by adjusting payments to 1988 dollars and excluding claims with real payments below $10,000.19 This approach has an important drawback here. Claims
with real payments below $10,000 are common, and the frequency of selfrepresentation is higher in claims with smaller payouts. Indeed, the highest
rate of self-representation occurs in the bracket creep claims. To preserve
information about self-representation, we therefore include bracket creep
claims in our summary tables. When studying time trends, however, we
adjust for bracket creep to avoid inflation-generated distortions.
When submitting closed claim information to the TDI, insurers use
“short forms” for claims with nominal payouts greater than $10,000 but
less than $25,000, and “long forms” for claims with nominal payouts of
$25,000 or more.20 Although both forms indicate whether the claimant
the 2003 Texas Medical Malpractice Damages Cap on Physician Supply and Insurer
Payouts: Separating Facts from Rhetoric, 44 TEXAS ADVOCATE 25 (2008) [hereinafter Separating Facts from Rhetoric], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139190; Charles Silver, Kathryn Zeiler, Bernard S. Black, David A. Hyman & William M. Sage, Malpractice
Payouts and Malpractice Insurance: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 33
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.: ISSUES & PRACTICE 177 (2008); Kathryn Zeiler, Charles
Silver, Bernard S. Black, David A. Hyman & William M. Sage, Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. s9 (2007) [hereinafter Physicians’ Insurance Limits]; Damage Caps, supra note
1.
18. Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar amounts in this paper are in 1988 dollars,
computed using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (annual average) as a
price index. Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2009). To
convert to 2008 dollars, multiply by 1.82. In regressions we define year as (year - 1988).
19. See supra note 17.
20. TEX. DEP’T OF INS., THE 2007 TEXAS LIABILITY INSURANCE CLOSED CLAIM ANNUAL
REPORT 1 (2009), available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/pc/documents/taccar2007.
pdf.
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hired an attorney, long forms contain much more information than short
forms.21 Many fields of potential interest—age, employment status, injury
type, and injury cause—appear only on the long form,22 and neither form
has all the information needed to fully study the choice between selfrepresentation and representation by counsel.23
The TCCD contains only insured claims.24 Rates of self-representation
may differ in uninsured cases, which lawyers are likely to find less appealing. The TCCD also contains only claims covered by commercial or professional lines of insurance.25 Cases involving personal lines of insurance,
for example, personal auto, homeowners, or watercraft policies, may have a
different pattern of self-representation as well. Unfortunately, we lack a
source of data with which to explore these issues.
II. RESULTS
A.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on all claims in the database.
Commercial auto claims are the most common, the least likely to involve
death as the injury alleged, and have the smallest mean and median
payouts. Medical malpractice claims are much less numerous than commercial auto claims, but have the highest frequency of death, as well as the
highest mean and median payouts.

21. Compare TEX. DEP’T OF INS., SHORT FORM, http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/forms/pcdata
services/pc134ccrptshort.doc (last visited Dec. 20, 2009), with TEX. DEP’T OF INS., LONG
FORM, http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/forms/pcdataservices/pc133ccrptlong.doc (last visited Dec.
20, 2009).
22. Compare TEX. DEP’T OF INS., SHORT FORM, http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/forms/pcdata
services/pc134ccrptshort.doc (last visited Dec. 20, 2009), with TEX. DEP’T OF INS., LONG
FORM, http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/forms/pcdataservices/pc133ccrptlong.doc (last visited Dec.
20, 2009).
23. A partial list of potentially relevant factors would include a variety of claim-related
characteristics, such as injury severity, uninsured medical costs, lost wages, the potential for
claim value to vary, and the obviousness of liability. Claimants’ personal characteristics,
such as their sex, education, nature of employment, claiming history, and experience with
lawyers may also matter. The cost of legal services seems highly likely to influence the decision to retain counsel as well. The TCCD contains none of this information. See supra
note 21.
24. See TEX. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 20.
25. The Texas Department of Insurance produces annual reports that describe the TCCD
and provide a yearly snapshot of findings. The annual reports can be downloaded free of
charge. See TEXAS DEP’T OF INSURANCE, supra note 20.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Claim Characteristics
Number of % of All %
Mean
Claims
Claims
Death Payout

363

Median
Payout

Commercial
Auto

99,047

56.5%

3.5%

$61,595

$16,304

General
Commercial

33,322

19.0%

8.1%

$146,409

$30,000

Medical
Professional

17,965

10.2%

29.1%

$261,941

$96,154

Multi-Peril

23,655

13.5%

6.5%

$108,587

$26,125

Other
Professional

1,437

0.8%

23.4%

$172,988

$38,820

Total

175,426

100.0%

7.5%

$105,471

$21,696

Closed claims in the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-2005, excluding duplicate
reports and one claim resolved at summary judgment, by line of coverage, nature of injury
alleged (death versus non-death), and mean and median payout (2008$).26 Includes “bracket creep” claims with payments below $10,000 (1988$).

Table 2 provides further descriptive statistics on whether the plaintiff
was represented by a lawyer and the resolution stage (pre-suit versus postsuit) of each claim. Table 2 indicates that across all lines of coverage 6.9%
of claimants represented themselves, ranging from 2.5% (medical professional) to 7.9% (commercial auto). In cases where no suit was filed, the
rate of self-representation was far higher, ranging from 13.4% (commercial
auto) to 24% (multi-peril). In claims where a lawsuit was filed, however,
the rate of self-representation was essentially zero across all lines of coverage. For unrepresented claimants, there is an unbridgeable chasm between
pre-suit and post-suit resolution. The probability of suit varied widely,
however, with commercial auto accounting for the lowest rate (42%) and
medical professional having the highest (89.5%).27

26. See supra note 16.
27. The tendency of formal litigation to occur more often in medical malpractice cases
than automobile cases has been observed before. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLIcy 56 (1985) (reporting that “[l]awsuits
[were] filed in only 20 percent of automobile claims . . . whereas suits [were] filed in 58
percent of malpractice cases . . . .”).
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Table 2. Summary Statistics on Self-Representation
% of Claimants Self-Represented
All
Claims

Claims
Resolved
Pre-Suit

Claims
Resolved
Post-Suit

% of Claims
Resolved
Post-Suit

Commercial
Auto

7.9%

13.4%

0.3%

42.0%

General
Commercial

6.1%

23.6%

0.2%

74.8%

Medical
Professional

2.5%

21.6%

0.3%

89.5%

Multi-Peril

7.7%

24.0%

0.3%

68.7%

Other
Professional

4.0%

18.6%

0.3%

79.4%

Total

6.9%

15.8%

0.2%

57.0%

Closed claims in the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-2005, excluding duplicate
reports and one claim resolved at summary judgment, by line of coverage, resolution litigation, and nature of representation (self vs. counsel).28 Includes “bracket creep” claims with
payments below $10,000 (1988$).

Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the relationship between selfrepresentation and payout. As it shows, across all lines of coverage the
frequency of self-representation declines steadily as the payout increases.
Coverage line still matters, however. Medical malpractice claimants retained lawyers more often than auto claimants at all payment levels except
the very smallest.

28. See supra note 16.
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Table 3. Self-Representation by Coverage Type and Payout Level
Comm. Gen.
Multi- Medical Other
Auto
Comm. Peril
Prof.
Prof.

All
Lines

Payout (2008$)

% of Claimants Self-Represented

<$10,000

11.4%

14.4%

15.2%

14.3%

8.8%

12.1%

$10,000-$15,000

9.5%

10.7%

12.2%

8.6%

7.1%

10.0%

$15,001-$20,000

8.7%

8.1%

10.4%

5.5%

8.5%

8.7%

$20,001-$25,000

7.9%

7.6%

9.2%

5.8%

7.3%

7.9%

$25,001-$50,000

5.7%

5.3%

6.6%

3.4%

2.4%

5.5%

$50,001-$100,000 4.2%

2.6%

3.9%

1.9%

3.1%

3.4%

>$100,000

2.4%

0.8%

0.8%

0.5%

0.7%

1.2%

All Paid Claims

7.9%

6.1%

7.7%

2.5%

4.0%

6.9%

Percent of paid claims in which claimants represented themselves by line of coverage and
payout (2008$), using the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-2005, excluding duplicate reports and one claim resolved at summary judgment.29 The first row is composed of
“bracket creep” claims with payments below $10,000 (1988$).

B.
1.

Multivariate Analysis

Changes in the Rate of Self-Representation over Time

We used multivariate analysis to study the factors that influence selfrepresentation and to determine whether the frequency of selfrepresentation changed over time. Because the dependent variable, “lawyer/no lawyer,” has only two possible values (1 when a claimant had counsel; 0 otherwise), we used logit regressions.30 To avoid reporting time
trends influenced by inflation, we excluded all “bracket creep” claims with
real payments below $10,000 (1988$). For independent variables, we used
(year-1988) and a dummy for whether the claim was filed after Texas
adopted tort reform in 1995.31 We report the results for each line of coverage and for the entire dataset. The results are shown in Table 4.
29. See supra note 16.
30. We ran identical probit regressions as robustness checks. In terms of the direction
of effects and statistical significance, the results were identical.
31. For a description of the 1995 reforms, see Physicians’ Insurance Limits, supra note
17, at s19-s20 and Martin Grace, Tort Reform: Are There Real Benefits? 8-11 (Aug. 2004)
(unpublished paper, on file with Georgia State University Center for Risk Management and
Insurance Research). A more extensive package of lawsuit restrictions applies to cases filed
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Table 4. Logit Regression Analysis of Self-Representation
Comm.
Gen.
Multi- Medical
Other
Auto
Comm. Peril
Prof.
Prof.

All
Lines

Dependent Variable—Representation by Counsel
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

.0397

.0755

.0669

.1952

.0121

.0695

Year

.0610

.1151

.1065

.2849

.1937

.0857

P>|z|

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.026

0.000

PostReform
Dummy

-.5205

-1.1060

-1.0072 -3.1996

-1.7635

-.7846

-.3162

-.7074

-.6307

-2.2061

.0468

-.6256

P>|z|

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.063

0.000

No. of
claims

79,272

30,460

21,549

17,558

1,323

150,162

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors of representation by counsel against year1988 and a tort reform dummy variable by line of insurance coverage for all claims with
payouts greater than $10,000 (1988$) in the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 19882005, excluding duplicate reports and one claim resolved at summary judgment.32 Coefficients are reported as 95% confidence intervals. Year = year–1988. Significant results are
bolded.

In Table 4, a confidence interval with only positive (negative) values indicates a statistically significant higher (lower) probability of representation by counsel as the value of an independent variable increases. Conversely, a confidence interval that spans zero indicates that there is no
statistically significant relationship between the probability of representation and the independent variable in question. Thus, the 95% confidence
interval of [.0397: .0610] shown in Table 4 for “Commercial Auto” claims
implies a statistically significant increase in the rate of representation by
counsel over time. The positive spreads for all lines of coverage also mean
the null hypothesis of no change over time can be rejected.

after September 1, 2003. When this paper was originally presented, the TCCD contained
claims that had closed by 2005. The vast majority of these claims were initiated before the
effective date of the 2003 statute. Accordingly, we do not attempt to study the impact of the
2003 reforms in this paper.
32. See supra note 16.
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Table 4 also indicates that the 1995 tort reform package slowed the trend
toward increasing use of counsel. The confidence intervals associated with
the post-reform dummy are negative and significant for all lines except
“Other Professional Liability.”
2.

Claim-level Factors

We now turn to claim-level factors that might affect the rate of selfrepresentation. Intuitively, the likelihood of self-representation should decline as legal services become more valuable. Three factors (claim size,
claim complexity, and the cost/availability of legal services) are likely predictors of such circumstances. We separately describe the logic for including each factor, and then analyze their combined impact.
a.

Claim Size

Claim size matters for two reasons. First, insurers should become more
reluctant to pay as the amount demanded from them grows. As repeat
players with appropriate knowledge and incentives, plaintiffs’ lawyers are
well situated to provide the needed “encouragement.” Second, plaintiffs’
risk aversion may increase with claim size. If so, plaintiffs with larger
claims should be more willing to spend money on legal services in order to
reduce their risks.33
The most obvious way to measure claim size is to use the payment a
claimant received, as we do in Table 3.34 Unfortunately, the possibility of
simultaneous (or reverse) causation makes payment a problematic independent variable. If attorneys in fact add value, their involvement increases
the payments their clients receive. Therefore, it may be true that more valuable claims are more likely to make their way to attorneys and that attorneys make claims more valuable than they otherwise would be.
Accordingly, we use policy limits as a proxy for claim size. The amount
of the policy limit is set before a claim occurs. Higher limits mean that
higher damages are collectible, since there is limited ability to collect

33. Huang, supra note 12, at 205, also finds that the likelihood of retaining counsel rises
with the amount in controversy. Unfortunately, he does not explain how this amount was
determined for the cases in his dataset. Sales et al., supra note 12, at 561, found that parties
with higher incomes retained lawyers more often in divorce cases, but they attributed this to
greater ability to afford counsel rather than to higher stakes.
34. Death is a measure of injury severity, but we cannot use death as an independent
variable because counsel appeared in all paid death claims.
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above limits.35 Policy size thus affects claim value without being tainted
by reverse causation.36
Because the TCCD contains policy limits only for the primary insurer,
we must exclude all multi-payer cases from regressions in which policy
limits are employed as an independent variable. Multi-payer cases are
those in which excess carriers or other sources contribute to settlements.
Excluding these cases reduces the size of the dataset by 20,356 claims. As
in Table 4, we also exclude cases with real payments below $10,000
(1988$) from all regressions to avoid bracket creep.
b.

Claim Complexity

As claims become more complex, specialized legal and factual knowledge becomes more important for plaintiffs.37 For example, when liability, causation, and damages are obvious (such as in most rear-end automobile collisions), self-representation is more practicable than when one or
more elements are difficult to gauge and likely to be disputed (as is usually
the case in medical malpractice cases). When claims are complex, simply
knowing how to develop and package them for consideration by insurance
carriers is valuable. Thus, it is easier for legal services to “add value” to
complex cases than to simple ones.
We use line of coverage as a (highly imperfect) proxy for claim complexity.38 Although the TCCD contains other indirect measures of claim

35. See Jury Verdicts, supra note 17, at 35; Separating Facts from Rhetoric, supra note
17, at 180-84; Physicians’ Insurance Limits, supra note 17, at s8. Medical malpractice
claimants recovered more than the policy limits only about 2% of the time. Defendants pay
only about 44% of the total amount awarded by juries—and they pay only about 10% of the
amount awarded above-limits, most of which is paid by insurers. DANZON, supra note 27, at
56, also found “that awards tend to rise with the limits of the defendant’s insurance coverage.” Danzon studied settlements separately from jury verdicts.
36. Higher limits may also indicate practice areas with special potential to inflict serious
injuries, such as surgery, obstetrics, or anesthesiology. Providers more likely to generate
high-dollar claims may purchase larger policies than others, both to protect their personal
assets and to satisfy minimum coverage requirements set by hospitals. Whether this is true,
however, is uncertain. Our studies of malpractice claims found that doctors with paid perinatal claims carried smaller policies than others, even though payments on perinatal claims
were above average. The correlation between policy size and exposure is therefore imperfect, at best.
37. See Sales et al., supra note 12, at 567 (finding that 39% of parties who hired lawyers
identified complexity as a reason for their doing so). On the basis of telephone interviews
with 273 parties to divorce lawsuits in Maricopa County, Arizona in 1991, Sales et al. also
concluded that case complexity, measured by the presence or absence of children in a marriage and the ownership of real estate, affected the decision to hire counsel. Id. at 564-65.
38. Huang, supra note 12, at 206-07, also finds variation in self-representation rates by
subject matter of litigation.
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complexity, such as the duration from injury to payment, the number of defendants, and the commencement of formal litigation,39 the possibility of
simultaneous (or reverse) causation complicates the use of these variables
in regressions. For example, although we expect more complex claims to
take longer than simpler ones, attorney involvement may increase (or decrease) claim duration. Even when claims are of similar complexity, attorneys may make fuller investigations or drag out negotiations longer than
self-represented claimants. Similarly, the number of defendants may motivate the plaintiff to hire a lawyer—but it is also possible that the lawyer
identified additional potential responsible parties—making claims handled
by lawyers seem more complex than would otherwise be the case. The filing of a formal complaint may also be more likely in relatively complex
cases, but the involvement of an attorney is effectively a precondition to the
filing of a lawsuit, as shown in Table 2. Accordingly, we rely on line of
coverage as a proxy for complexity, with the expectation that commercial
auto claims will be simpler than other types of lawsuits.
c.

Cost of Legal Services

Finally, the cost and availability of legal services should matter as well.
Other things being equal, more availability and lower cost should imply
higher utilization—particularly if more availability and lower costs encourage the development of a “culture of claiming.”40 In Texas, as in other
states, lawyers concentrate in urban areas. Claimants residing in urban
counties may therefore be more likely to use lawyers than rural Texans.41
To test this hypothesis, we created an urban/rural county dummy variable
using the membership list of the Texas Conference of Urban Counties. The

39. See supra note 21.
40. Claiming rates vary considerably both across states and within them. See, e.g., INS.
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS, PART ONE: ANALYSIS OF CLAIM FREQUENCY 11 (2d ed. 1995) (reporting a national average of twenty-nine bodily injury (“BI”)
claims per 100 property damage (“PD”) claims for tort (i.e., fault) states in 1993, ranging
from a high of sixty-one BI claims per 100 PD claims in California to a low of eighteen in
Wyoming); id. at 3 (“Central city territories usually have more bodily injury claims per 100
property damage claims than territories composed of suburbs, medium-sized cities, small
towns, or rural areas.”). Even across urban areas, however, substantial variation can occur.
See id. (reporting ninety-nine BI claims per 100 PD claims in Los Angeles but only forty in
San Diego). See also Kevin D. Hart & Philip G. Peters, Cultures of Claiming: Local Variation in Malpractice Claim Frequency, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 77 (2008).
41. Stated differently, rural residents may be more likely to “lump it.” See, e.g., VASANTHAKUMAR N. BHAT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS 118-19 (2001)
(finding that patients in urban areas are more likely to sue dentists, but finding a negative
association between trial lawyers per capita and the frequency of dental malpractice claims).
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variable takes a value of one for the thirty-five counties that are members
and a value of zero for the 219 counties that are not.42
d.

Regression Analysis

Table 5 presents logit regressions by coverage line using these independent variables. It also presents an aggregate regression on the entire dataset
in which “Commercial Auto” is the omitted line of coverage.

42. See Texas Conference of Urban Counties—FAQ, http://www.cuc.org/faq.aspx
#members (last visited Dec. 17, 2009) (listing the thirty-five counties that are members of
the Texas Conference of Urban Counties).
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Table 5. Multivariate Logistic Regression of Likelihood of Representation
by Counsel by Coverage Line and for All Lines
Comm. Gen.
Multi- Medical Other
All
Auto
Comm. Peril
Prof.
Prof.
Lines
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
.0401:
.0692: .0639: .1772: .0293: .0637:
Year
.0617
.1097
.1044
.2681
.2209
.0805
P>|z|
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.010
0.000
Post-Reform
-.5128: -.9726: -.9714: -2.8125: -1.978: -.7095:
Dummy
-.3066
-.5638 -.5869 -1.8247 -.1473 -.5467
P>|z|
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.023
.000
.0583: -.1831: -.645: -.323: .0558:
Ln(Policy
.1065:
.1814
.0174
-.4569 .426
.1018
Limit (1988$)) .1557
P>|z|
0.000
0.000
0.105
0.000
0.787
0.000
.2314:
.0505: .1343: -.4728: -.9429: .1928:
Urban
.3557
.2854
.3872
.0883
.4081
.2912
P>|z|
0.000
0.005
0.000
0.179
0.438
0.000
.0064:
Gen. Comm.
.1261
P>|z|
.030
-.25:
Multi-Peril
-.1282
P>|z|
.000
.7969:
Medical Prof.
1.013
P>|z|
.000
.1803:
Other Prof.
.7751
P>|z|
.002
.0708:
-.2948: 1.6297: 9.0604: -3.355: .739:
Constant
.7263
1.3767 4.3143 11.7076 7.3869 1.3503
P>|z|
.017
.205
.000
.000
.462
.000
No. of claims
75,112 23,837 17,454 12,349 1,048
129,800
Logistic regressions with robust standard errors of representation by counsel by line of insurance coverage for all single-payer claims with payouts greater than $10,000 (1988$) in
the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-2005, excluding duplicate reports and one
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claim resolved at summary judgment.43 Coefficients are reported as 95% confidence intervals. Year = Year–1988. Statistically significant results are bolded. Commercial Auto is
the omitted coverage line in the All Lines regression.

As in Table 4, across all lines of coverage we find a consistent timetrend toward increased use of counsel and a negative impact from the 1995
tort reforms. Larger exposure (proxied by ln(policy limits)) is associated
with an increased use of counsel in two coverage lines (commercial auto
and general commercial), but with decreased use of counsel in medical
malpractice. Claimants in urban areas are more likely to use counsel in
three coverage lines—commercial auto, general commercial, and multiperil. Regression [6] indicates that, relative to commercial auto, the probability of employing counsel was higher in general liability, medical professional, and other professional coverage, but lower in multi-peril.
The results in regression [4] for medical professional liability are counterintuitive, since the Urban dummy is insignificant and larger policy limits
predict a lower likelihood of representation by counsel. The unimportance
of location has a plausible explanation. Medical malpractice injuries tend
to be unusually severe. These cases have by far the highest mean and median payments, and in almost 30% of the cases the patients died. The size
of malpractice claims may justify the cost of searching for a lawyer, regardless of where one resides.
The negative impact of policy limits in regression [4] is harder to understand. Why might higher policy limits make it less attractive to retain
counsel? Insurers’ settlement behavior may explain this result. Insurers
know how much coverage providers carry. Insurance policies also require
providers to give insurers prompt notice of mishaps likely to cause liability
claims. Taking advantage of this information, insurers may identify claims
with significant potential to generate large losses and seek to settle them
before plaintiffs’ counsel becomes involved. The presence of counsel on
the claimant’s side drives up insurers’ costs by increasing both payouts and
litigation expenses.44 It therefore makes sense for insurers to intervene aggressively in cases with clear liability and large policy limits, where the potential savings are the greatest.

43. See supra note 16.
44. This has been known for years. See HAMMITT, supra note 14, at 34-36 (studying
closed automobile claims collected in 1977 and finding that “[r]epresented claimants not
only recover[ed] larger payments on average, they [were] also significantly more likely to
recover some payment for general damages than [were] unrepresented claimants with comparable injuries”); see also id. at 64 (finding that the “average time to settlement [of BI
claims] more than double[d] when claimants hired attorneys”).
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Table 6 provides some suggestive evidence supporting this hypothesis.
It shows that mean and median real policy limits for self-representing medical malpractice claimants are nearly double those of claimants armed with
attorneys. By contrast, the median real policy limit post-suit is nearly the
same for both types of claimants.
Table 6. Policy Limits for Medical Professional Liability Claims Resolved
Pre- and Post-Suit
Claims Settled Pre-Suit
Claims Settled Post-Suit
SelfClaimants
Representing with
Claimants
Counsel

SelfRepresenting
Claimants

Claimants
with
Counsel

Mean
Policy Limit
(1988$)

$2,016,074

$1,179,335

$2,151,065

$906,811

Median
Policy Limit
(1988$)

$1,211,387

$657,462

$672,138

$605,693

No. of
claims

387

1283

36

11,043

Mean and median policy limits (1988$) for self-representing claimants and claims with
counsel by resolution stage, using claims covered by Medical Professional Liability policies
in the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-2005, excluding duplicate reports and one
claim resolved at summary judgment.45 Includes “bracket creep” claims with payments below $10,000 (1988$).

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Implications of Our Findings

Although 7% of paid BI claimants were self-represented, virtually every
paid claimant who filed suit had legal counsel.46 The conventional view is
that settlement occurs in the shadow of the expected outcome at trial.47 Assuming that is correct, it follows that only BI claimants with lawyer-worthy
claims can obtain settlement payments.
Stated differently, self45. See supra note 16.
46. See supra note 16. Because the TCCD includes only paid claims, we do not capture
the representation patterns of those who engaged in litigation but did not receive a payout.
47. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 969-70 (1979).
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representation only works for claimants who could hire attorneys if they
wanted to—since only these claimants can threaten insurers with the risk of
losing at trial. Claimants with non-lawyer-worthy claims will not receive
anything, because they cannot credibly threaten to extract a forced payment
in an amount set by a court.48 Unless insurers willingly throw money at
claims on which they face no exposure at trial—a doubtful proposition—
the only plausible inference is that they thought the unrepresented claimants they paid would have been able to hire lawyers, had they tried. As
Alfred F. Conard observed in the 1950s, a claimant’s ability to hire a lawyer and sue “is the threat that makes defendants settle.”49
The obvious conclusion is that a cap on contingency fees, if set below
the market-clearing price for legal services, will result in many claimants
being left without any recourse against those who caused their injuries.
This conclusion provides a simple incentive-based explanation for the support for caps shown by tort-reform advocates: capping attorneys’ fees helps
defendants, not plaintiffs.
One additional note: quality of lawyering matters as well. We have focused on a binary set of options: lawyer or no-lawyer. But, if price caps
reduce the quality of lawyering, both sides are likely to take the case less
seriously (and its value is likely to be reduced) relative to what would happen in a world without such caps. For example, in cases involving social
security benefits, the government initially takes a position that is not “substantially justified” (which results in a fee award under the Equal Access to
Justice Act) 42% of the time; in veterans’ benefits cases, the government’s
position is not substantially justified 70% of the time.50 Does anyone believe it is a coincidence that error rates are high when fees are capped?
B.

Time Trends

After controlling for the tort reforms enacted in 1995, we find a consistent decline in self-representation across all five lines of coverage. Similar
results have been reported in earlier research.51 What might explain these
48. Cf. Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 321 (1993) (“Her suit sought damages, and if it
had merit she might be able to retain a tort lawyer to handle it on a contingent basis. . . . If
the plaintiff were unable to secure a lawyer in the private market, this might mean the suit
had no merit, although alternatively it might mean that the plaintiff lacked the necessary information to obtain a suitable lawyer.”).
49. Alfred F. Conard, The Impact of Expense on Injury Claims, 287 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 110, 114 (May 1953).
50. Posting of Marcia Coyle to The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times,
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/02/roberts-startled-by-government-errors-in-vetcases.html (Feb. 23, 2010, 12:13 EST).
51. See INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 1.
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patterns? The cost of self-representation may have increased or the cost of
legal services may have declined. Rising real wages could account for the
former. The latter could be explained by growth in the supply of lawyers
or the rise of law firms that specialize in small claims, often referred to derisively as “settlement mills.”52 Alternatively, insurers in Texas may have
grown increasingly reluctant to pay unrepresented claimants—and claimants responded by hiring lawyers. Unfortunately, we are unable to distinguish between these possible explanations with the information available
in the TCCD.
C.

Effect of 1995 Tort Reforms

The probability of self-representation increased following the tort reforms adopted by Texas in 1995. The most obvious explanation for this is
that more claimants had to represent themselves because the supply of legal
services contracted. In other words, tort reforms made legal services less
available, making self-representation more attractive.
The problem with this argument is that claimants who cannot secure representation cannot extract settlement payments from insurers because they
cannot credibly threaten to sue. Self-representation is a viable option only
for claimants who could “lawyer up” if it became necessary.53 If tort reforms make legal services more expensive/less available, claimants who
could pay the higher prices but do not wish to may find self-representation
attractive, but claimants who are priced out of the market must simply give
up. Claimants who lost access to lawyers as a result of 1995 legislation
should not turn up as successful self-representing claimants in the TCCD;
they should become unsuccessful claimants and drop out of the dataset entirely.
Another possibility is that the 1995 tort reforms reduced the need for legal services by making it easier to evaluate the merits of claims. Some
claimants presumably start out by representing themselves and consult a
lawyer only after a malpractice insurer rejects their demands or offers them
less than they want. In some of these instances, plaintiffs’ attorneys decide
that the insurer wrongly failed to pay or offered too little, and sign up the
clients. In a fraction of these cases, the insurer pays the claim after counsel
is retained and the claim appears in the TCCD as one with a represented
claimant.

52. For a description of plaintiffs’ law firms that specialize in processing small claims
cheaply, see generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1485, 1487 (2009).
53. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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If tort reforms make claim values easier to detect and harder to manipulate, insurers should generate false negatives less often and plaintiffs’ attorneys should agree with insurers more often. In other words, plaintiffs’ attorneys should more often reject claimants who were dissatisfied with the
treatment they received from insurers. The rejected claimants should then
either take whatever non-zero offer they received (and be identified as selfrepresented in the TCCD) or drop their claims (and fall out of the TCCD).
In either event, the frequency of successful self-represented claimants
should rise relative to that of represented claimants.
This explanation is consistent with a study by Professor Martin Grace,
who found that post-1995 claimants received a higher fraction of the compensation they demanded in settlement of their claims (44% pre-reform
versus 49% post-reform).54 Grace hypothesized that higher percentage recoveries occurred because the 1995 reforms made it more difficult for
claimants to manipulate their damages.55 In other words, the reforms
enabled insurance carriers to have greater confidence in claimants’ assertions because fraudulent and inflated demands were easier to spot.
D.

The Proof is in the Pudding

Apart from the claims reported to the TCCD, is there any other evidence
that tort reform can interrupt a trend toward greater use of private counsel?
In a series of articles, Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin explored the impact of the 1995 and 2003 Texas tort reforms on plaintiffs’ lawyers’ willingness to take cases.56 They report that many plaintiffs’ attorneys cut
back, especially in the area of medical malpractice.57 Their finding suggests that the cost of private counsel increased, causing the balance to shift
in favor of self-representation for some claimants.
E.

Experience in Other States

Studies conducted in other states also find that unrepresented claimants
generally cannot sue successfully. A 1993 American Bar Foundation
(“ABF”) study used a Wisconsin dataset of closed medical malpractice
claims. It found that self-representation was no substitute for representation by an attorney. Of the 2,896 closed claims in the study, 59 involved

54.
55.
56.
57.

See Grace, supra note 31, at 22.
Id. at 25.
See The Texas Two-Step, supra note 11.
Survival of the Fittest, supra note 11, at 317-19.
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pro se plaintiffs and another 102 involved unrepresented plaintiffs.58
“Claimants were able to secure a monetary settlement in only 1 of the 59
pro se claims [a success rate of 1.7%], and 8 of the other 102 claims [a success rate of 7.8%].”59 In contrast, the success rate for all claimants
represented by counsel was 33.4%60 and the success rate for claimants
represented by the two most experienced plaintiffs’ firms in the study was
50.2%.61 Older studies also found that unrepresented claimants obtained
payments less often than claimants armed with attorneys.62 Thus, representation makes a difference and the best representation can make a substantial
difference.
Unlike the TCCD, the Wisconsin dataset included claims that closed
without payments.63 Lumping pro se litigants and unrepresented litigants
together, the ABF report indicates that claimants without attorneys went
home empty-handed 94.4% of the time (152/161 = 94.4%).64
The Wisconsin data came from a single state-backed medical malpractice insurer, the Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance Plan
(“WHCLIP”).65 The dataset also contained only 6,727 closed claims, more
than half of which were incident reports in which “no legal claim was filed
and . . . the patient did not assert a claim for money.”66 The analysis focused on 2,896 claims in which formal legal proceedings were commenced.
By contrast, the TCCD contains over 182,000 reports of paid claims
filed by all admitted carriers operating in the Texas market. It therefore
provides a more comprehensive picture of claiming behavior than the Wisconsin dataset. The TCCD reports also cover all commercial coverage
lines, not just medical malpractice. Finally, the reports in the TCCD cover
58. Stephen Daniels et al., Why Kill All the Lawyers? Repeat Players and Strategic Advantage in Medical Malpractice Claims 6 (Am. B. Found. Working Paper No. 9210, 1993)
(Pro se claimants were formally listed as such in the claim file. For unrepresented claimants, the claim file simply did not identify the claimants’ attorney.).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 7.
61. See id. at 20.
62. Marc A. Franklin, Robert H. Chanin & Irving Mark, Accidents, Money, and the
Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13
(1961) (study of personal injury cases finding success rates of 90% and 65% for represented
and unrepresented claimants, respectively). See Clarence Morris & James C. N. Paul, The
Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 924 (1962) (reporting
that 95% (111 of 117) of represented claimants with non-fatal injuries stemming from automobile accidents obtained some recovery, and that only 66% (129 of 194) of unrepresented claimants did).
63. Daniels et al., supra note 58, at 16.
64. Id. at 6.
65. Id. at 13.
66. Id. at 16.
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all claims on which insurers paid more than $10,000 (nominal), including
claims insurers settled without formal litigation. The TCCD thus enables
one to examine an area of claiming behavior—pre-suit resolution—in
which self-representation may be especially common.
Comparing Wisconsin and Texas, one difference jumps out. The ABF
study does not analyze or present results for the pre-lawsuit period, which,
in Texas, was the most common way for unrepresented BI claimants to obtain recoveries. Across all lines of insurance, about 7% of the reports in the
TCCD concerned unrepresented BI claimants who recovered payments
without filing lawsuits. The percentage for the medical malpractice coverage line was relatively low, but still positive. Judging from the ABF report,
the analogous recovery rate for medical malpractice claimants in Wisconsin
appears to be zero.
We originally suspected that the manner of reporting data accounted for
the difference between the ABF report’s findings and our own. In fact, the
findings appear to reflect a real difference in the way claims were handled.
According to Stephen Daniels, “WHCLIP didn’t really pay much attention
to something in terms [of] setting aside reserves or entertaining any settlement discussions until the other side went through the trouble of filing a
formal legal complaint.”67 Texas insurers, including those that sell medical
malpractice coverage, do not require such a show of force. Were they to do
so, the data strongly suggest that for claims of all types the rate of successful self-representation would drop to near zero—that is, to the Wisconsin
rate. It is all but impossible for medical malpractice claimants to sue successfully without help from attorneys.
As a claims handling strategy, there is something to be said for the policy of waiting for claimants to sue.68 Some claims are meritorious; some
are not. It can be hard to distinguish the former from the latter, especially
when claims are complex. Rather than bear the cost of sorting all claims,
including those that gave rise only to incident reports or were brought to
their attention by unrepresented claimants, WHCLIP used plaintiffs’ attorneys to do some initial sorting for it. It used a contingent fee lawyer’s wil-

67. E-mail from Stephen Daniels to Charles Silver (Nov. 11, 2008, 14:10:00 CST) (on
file with author).
68. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort
Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1122 (2006) (“Nothing prevents
providers or liability carriers from offering payments before patients sue or from paying valid claims expeditiously. Yet, they rarely compensate patients until threatened with litigation . . . . [B]y and large, compensation flows only to patients who sue and only after litigation becomes protracted. On economic grounds this is easy to explain. Given the high
degree of under-claiming and the high drop rates for malpractice cases, the strategy of paying claims only after protracted litigation minimizes expected liability costs.”).
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lingness to handle a claim as a signal that the claim was worth a closer
look. WHCLIP ignored other claims because unrepresented claimants
could not credibly threaten to sue.
Texas insurers relied on plaintiffs’ attorneys less heavily than WHCLIP,
but the difference should not be exaggerated. In Texas, only 450 of 17,515
paid medical malpractice claims (2.5%) involved self-represented claimants. Texas medical malpractice insurers therefore had the benefit of
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ sorting efforts in the vast majority of paid claims. We
find a similar pattern across all lines of coverage and payout. As Table 3
reflects, the highest rate of self-representation is found in multi-peril cases
with a payout of less than $10,000—but even here, only 15% of plaintiffs
proceed without a lawyer. Lawyers’ willingness to handle small claims
supports the inference that unrepresented claimants succeed only because
they could “lawyer up” if necessary.
F.

Wealth and Income and the Decision to Hire Counsel

Disagreement exists over whether or how greatly parties’ wealth and income affect the decision to employ counsel to address legal problems.69
Because the TCCD contains no measure of claimants’ wealth or income,
we cannot assess this factor’s importance. Based on other research and
discussions with plaintiffs’ lawyers in Texas, however, we believe that essentially all claimants who hire lawyers in BI suits in Texas use contingent
percentage fee arrangements. Because these arrangements free claimants
from the obligation of paying for legal services except from their recoveries, we would not expect wealth or income to directly influence the decision to hire lawyers.
To be sure, income might indirectly affect lawyers’ willingness to take
cases. All other things equal, claimants with higher incomes will have
higher lost earnings. If the lawyer’s fee is a fixed percentage of the recovery, higher lost earnings will translate into a higher fee. In addition, many
plaintiffs’ lawyers will only accept a case if there is a minimum amount of
damages—and claimants with higher incomes will more easily satisfy this

69. Compare AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS AMONG LOW-INCOME AND MODERATEINCOME HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS
STUDY (1994) (finding that wealth matters) and Bruce D. Sales, Connie J. Beck & Richard
K. Haan, Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 594-98 (1993) (also finding that wealth matters)
with Herbert M. Kritzer, To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer, Is that the Question?, 5 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 875 (2008) (finding similar lawyer retention patterns across wealth levels).
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requirement.70 In combination, these factors make high-income claimants
more appealing than low-income claimants.
G. Limitations of Our Study
We do not offer a formal model of the decision to hire or not hire a lawyer. Without a model, considerable caution is required in interpreting the
patterns we document. For example, the time trends we observe are only
meaningful if, inter alia, the claiming environment is otherwise stable. If
the environment changed in ways affecting the cost and value of legal services, claimants’ propensity to hire lawyers may have changed as well. Although we have controlled for the factors we were able to identify, our
findings are tentative. Further research will be necessary to fully understand the dynamics at stake.
CONCLUSION
Over an extended period, and across multiple lines of coverage, an
overwhelming majority of successful bodily injury claimants in Texas decided they needed a lawyer. When claims can be resolved without the initiation of formal litigation, a small percentage of claimants decide to
represent themselves. The option of self-representation exists for these
claimants because they have lawyer-worthy claims. In other words, these
claimants can credibly threaten to “lawyer up” unless paid amounts they
consider satisfactory.
Tort reforms can cause the supply of legal services to contract by capping fees, reducing claim values, or making litigation riskier or more expensive for claimants. All these changes alter the costs and benefits of legal representation, and thus affect the decision to hire counsel or do
without. When the scarcity of legal services increases, some claimants who
could hire lawyers find it economically better to represent themselves, but
many others are priced out of the market entirely. For these claimants, the
only option is to abandon their claims. Only claimants who can credibly
threaten to litigate successfully can extract settlement payments, and claimants who cannot find lawyers cannot make this threat.

70. Hyman & Silver, supra note 68, at 1117-20 (describing efforts by plaintiffs’ lawyers
to screen cases with routine rejection of cases with insufficient damages).

